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LEGISLATION
THE EFFECT OF MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION STATUTES ON
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The extensive distribution of automobiles in recent years has
brought into prominence the use of motor vehicles as security
for debts. Consequently, many unique problems have been
raised, problems which are quite distinct from those present in
the usual chattel mortgage or conditional sale situation.
The source of these new difficulties may be traced to the
fundamental nature of the motor vehicle-its relative mobility
in comparison with other chattels; whereas household goods,
animals, farm crops, and other frequently mortgaged personalty
are comparatively stationary, the automobile is peculiarly sus-
ceptible to removal from county or state without arousing any
suspicions. Thus, a prospective California purchaser would not
be prone to express concern if the automobile he intends to buy
had its original situs in Missouri. This problem of the possibly
constantly changing situs of an automobile made it exceedingly
difficult for mortgagees and other lienholders to protect their
interests by an ordinary recordation of the encumbrance, for
obviously a mortgage legally and properly recorded in Missouri
could hardly be termed constructive notice to the California
purchaser; one of two innocent parties, the mortgagee or the
subsequent purchaser, must sustain a loss when the mortgagor
sells his automobile and fraudulently conceals the prior lien.
Fortunately, other public policy factors' have prompted virt-
ually every state legislature in our country to adopt some form
of registration act, whereby the title to every existing motor
vehicle must be duly registered in an appropriate state or county
office. The typical registration statute provides that every
automobile owned locally must be thus registered, and further
provides that a certificate of registration (a certificate of title)
be issued to every such owner as evidence of his compliance with
1. The most compelling reason for the adoption of registration statutes
was to combat the increasing wave of auto thefts by making it impossible
for a thief, with mere possession and no registration certificate, to sell an
automobile to an innocent purchaser.
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the provision.2 This certificate of title, which is generally re-
garded as prima facie evidence of ownership, 3 must then be
indorsed and assigned to the transferee before any assignment
of the automobile becomes valid and legally cognizable., Thus
the registration statute operates as a protection to all who have
occasion to deal with motor vehicle titles, for it obviates the
necessity of relying upon circumstantial evidence (usually post
session) as to ownership.
It is thus observed that the operation of these various registra-
tion statutes has introduced a new legal concept, the certificate
of title, which has been subjected to a great variety of judicial
definitions and interpretations. It may safely be generalized that
this certificate of title, issued to the registered owner of an
automobile, is not a muniment of title, but is rather a mere
indicium of ownership which raises a rebuttable presumption
of title in its holder.5
However, many states have made advantageous use of the
certificate of title by making it an instrument of notice, whereby
all the world may be informed of any existing liens or encum-
brances on each particular motor vehicle. It is the interpretation
and effect of these statutes, making the certificate of title a
notice-giving instrument, with which this note is concerned.
The statutes of the various jurisdictions within the United
States may be arbitrarily classified into three groups according
to the operation and effect of each particular statute. The first
species of statutes is the most strict, providing that all out-
standing liens and encumbrances on a motor vehicle must be
noted on the certificate of title, otherwise there will be no
constructive notice to the world. The second group consists of
statutes which merely provide for such liens and encumbrances
to be entered onto the certificate of title, but which express no
provision as to notice. Obviously, the effect of this type of
statute rests heavily on judicial interpretation and construction.
The third classification of statutes comprehends those which,
although providing for the issuance of certificates of title, make
2. M o. REv. STAT. §§ 301.140-301.240 (1949).
3. Rice St. Motors v. Smith, 167 Pa. Super. 159, 74 A.2d 535 (1950).
4. See note 1 supra.
5. Nash Miami Motors v. Bandel, 47 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1950); Rice St.
Motors v. Smith, 167 Pa. Super. 159, 74 A.2d 535 (1950).
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no provision for the notation of liens and encumbrances on such
certificates.
The operation of these various statutes has had a revolution-
ary effect on security transactions involving automobiles. No
conscientious practitioner should undertake the consummation
of such a transaction without first consulting and complying
with the applicable laws of the appropriate jurisdiction.
STATUTES PROVIDING THAT NOTATION OF
ENCUMBRANCE ON CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
Is NECESSARY FOR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE
The recordation and chattel mortgage laws with respect to
motor vehicles have been completely upset in many states adopt-
ing strict registration provisions. The typical statute enforced
in this group of jurisdictions requires that all liens or encum-
brances on motor vehicles must be noted on the certificate of
title which is in the owner's possession, otherwise there can be
no constructive notice of the lienholder's claim.6 For example,
the usual regulation, as typified by the Missouri statute, pro-
vides:
A mortgage on a motor vehicle shall not be notice to the
whole world, unless the record thereof is noted on the
certificate of title to the mortgaged vehicle .... 7
In each instance, the statute stipulates the procedure to be
followed, so that proper notation may be inscribed on the certifi-
cate of title. Usually, provision is made for the mortgagee to
secure the certificate from the mortgagor, then forward it,
together with a copy of the instrument creating the encum-
brance, to some specified state or county office. Thereafter a
6. Sixteen jurisdictions have adopted this type of statutory provision:
ARIz. CODE ANN. c. 66, § 231 (1939); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 16, § 13 (18)
(Supp. 1950); DEL. REV. CODE §§ 5573, 5574 (1935); D.C. CODE §40-702
(1940) ;FLA. STAT. § 319.15 (1941); IDAHO CODE c. 49 § 412 (Supp. 1949);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.480 (1949); MONT. REV. CODE C. 53, § 110 (1947); NEB.
REv. STAT. c. 60, § 110 (1943); N.M. STAT ANN. c. 68, §§ 115, 119 (1941);
OHio CODE ANN. § 6290-9 (1940); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 940.5 (Supp.
1950); TENN. CODE § 5538.55 (Williams, Supp. 1950); TEx. PEN. CODE art.
1436 § 1 (1948) ; UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 57, c. 3a, § 80 (1943) ; VA. CODE tit.
46, §§ 69, 71 (1950).
Although some of these statutory provisions may vary in their opera-
tions, they all have one common effect: non-compliance with the registra-
tion statute negates all constructive notice, notwithstanding compliance
with the ordinary chattel mortgage recordation law.
7. MO. REV. STAT. §443.480 (1949).
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proper notation is made on the registration records and the
certificate of title, and the latter is returned to the owner with
a proclamation of the encumbrance now fully indorsed theron.8
Thus, through clever utilization of the certificate of title, an
elaborate and efficient recordation system has been devised,
whereby all parties concerned will be given very adequate and
timely notice of outstanding liens and encumbrances on any
given vehicle. Because registration statutes require a transfer
of the certificate of title in any sale or assignment of an
automobile, a prospective purchaser will always have ample
opportunity to inspect the certificate before the transaction is
consummated. Any encumbrances on the title, noted on the
certificate as required by statute, would thereby come to the
immediate attention of the intended transferee. Hence the
registration statutes of the jurisdictions in this group provide
for more positive and effective notice of liens than do ordinary
chattel mortgage recordation acts.
These statutes, as one would expect, have a definite impact
on the ordinary recording provisions for chattel mortgages. In
virtually every jurisdiction employing this strict type of lien
registration statute, there has been a judicial or legislative
declaration that, insofar as security transactions involving motor
vehicles are concerned, the ordinary chattel mortgage recorda-
tion act is superseded. For example, in many of these states
the registration statutes specifically declare that henceforth it
shall be unnecessary to file or record chattel mortgages on auto-
mobiles., In fact, the legislature of Arizona has gone so far as
to prohibit all county clerks from recording liens or mortgages
on motor vehicles. 0 In those states not having an express
statutory provision over-ruling the recording act with respect
to motor vehicles, the same result has been accomplished by
judicial decision.,
8. This procedure is illustrated by the typical Arizona provision, ARIz.
CODE ANN. c.66, § 231 (1939).
9. ARrz. CODE ANN. c. 66, § 231 (1949); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 16, § 13 (18)
(Supp. 1950); FLA. STAT. § 319.15 (1941); IDAHO CODE c. 49, § 412 (Supp.
1949); MONT. REV. CODES c. 53, § 110 (1947); TENN. CODE § 5538.55 (Wil-
liams, Supp. 1950).
10. ARiZ. CODE ANN. c. 66, § 231 (1939).
11. See, for example, Commercial Credit Co. v. American Mfg. Co., 155
S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), where it was held that the act relating
to certificates of title to automobiles repealed and superseded those parts
of the chattel mortgage registration statutes, in so far as they affected
registration or chattel mortgage liens on automobiles.
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To illustrate this conclusive effect of the registration act on
recordation there is a recent Texas case12 where the court was
confronted with a situation in which the mortgagee had fully
complied with the recordation act in filing his mortgage, but
had failed to have the lien noted on the certificate of title in
compliance with the motor vehicle registration provisions. The
court held that there was no constructive notice to a subsequent
purchaser, even though the mortgage was duly recorded and
filed. Although the decision may seem harsh, a similar result
would have undoubtedly been reached had the case arisen in
any of the other jurisdictions adhering to a strict motor vehicle
registration statute of the type now under consideration. The
reasoning is obvious-a purchaser under such a registration
act would justifiably place full reliance on the certificate of title
displayed by the owner, and in the absence of any lien notations
thereon, he would assume the title is clear. To charge such
purchaser with constructive notice of a recorded chattel mort-
gage not listed on the title certificate would seem to defeat the
entire purpose of the statute, for such certificate would no longer
be a reliable indication of outstanding encumbrances on a motor
vehicle title. The general rule, then, is certainly justifiable. In
all jurisdictions employing this strict species of automobile
registration statute, it may quite safely be assumed that the
ordinary filing and recordation acts do not apply wherever the
security transaction involves a motor vehicle.
These strict registration statutes might be criticized by some
as imposing an unreasonable burden on the mortgagee. Since
the mortgagor has possession of the certificate of title, it might
be thought exceedingly difficult for the lienholder to enforce
a compliance with the statute by having the encumbrance prop-
erly noted. However, such an obstacle should not prove particu-
larly difficult to surmount; the mortgagee, being the party ad-
vancing credit, is in a position to dictate his own terms, one of
which should be the surrender of the certificate of title in order
to have the lien properly indorsed thereon. As the Nebraska
Supreme Court point out:
... one holding a lien upon a motor vehicle must, insofar as
he can reasonably do so, protect himself and others there-
12. Motor Investment Co. v. Knox City, 141 Tex. 530, 174 S.W.2d 482(1943).
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after dealing in good faith, by complying and requiring
compliance with the applicable laws concerning certificates
of title... .13 [Emphasis added]
Thus, a definite duty is assigned to every motor vehicle mort-
gagee to effect a compliance with the registration act.
Of course, when such mortgagee does everything reasonably
possible to require such compliance, he should be discharged
from further responsibility for a failure of the lien to be
registered on the title certificate. For example, a Texas court
was confronted with a situation in which an automobile owner
executed an application for certificate of title showing a mort-
gage as an encumbrance; then, after examination and approval
by the mortgagee, said owner fraudulently altered the applica-
tion to show no lien, and subsequently was issued a clear title
certificate. 1 4 The court held the mortgagee was not deprived of
his lien, even against a bona fide purchaser, analogizing the
situation to that where a forgery in the chain of title deprives
an innocent purchaser of all protection.15 Therefore, while the
mortgagee is required to diligently demand and exact a com-
pliance with the registration act, his obligations in this respect
are limited by the bounds of propriety.
Another resounding effect of this strict type of registration
statute is with respect to the law of pledges. Virtually every
jurisdiction adhering to such statute exempts from its provisions
all pledges and liens dependent upon possession.-8 The justifica-
tion for such exemption is obvious; since the lien is effective
only so long as possession is retained by the claimant, it is
unnecessary to provide for notice to third parties. Certainly no
one would deal with a vehicle of which the purported owner
is not in possession. For this same reason, pledges and other
such possessory liens have usually been omitted from the pro-
'visions of chattel mortgage recording acts. However, the motor
vehicle registration act has created an important innovation in
the law of pledges. If the pledge is noted on the certificate of
title as an encumbrance, then the pledgor can retain possession
13. Securities Credit Corp. v. Pindell, 153 Neb. 298, 307, 44 N.W.2d 501,
506 (1950).
14. Dublin Nat. Bank v. Chastian, 167 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942).
15. Ibid.
16. See note 6 supra.
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without destroying the security.17 This is a complete reversal
of the common law, under which the security of the pledgee was
based solely on his possession.,, With the lien noted on the
certificate of title, no longer need possession of the chattel be
relied upon as security, for third parties will have adequate
notice of the outstanding encumbrance on the title. This impor-
tant change wrought by the registration act should greatly
facilitate the use of automobile pledges as a security device.,'
Several jurisdictions, although not adopting the strict registra-
tion provision requiring that liens be noted on the title certifi-
cate, have invented other statutory devices by which the same
results are obtained. -2° In each of these jurisdictions the mort-
gagee is required to be registered as the legal owner of the
automobile in order for third persons to be charged with con-
structive notice of the encumbrance. 21 For example, code provi-
sions of both California and Hawaii require that the mortgagee
take all the necessary steps and make proper application to
register himself as the legal owner of the motor vehicle. Only
when the registration records disclose that such mortgagee holds
legal title will there be deemed to be constructive notice to third
parties.-'- Two other states, Nebraska and Washington, have
accomplished the same result through a different procedure. The
registration acts in these jurisdictions require that the mort-
gagee retain the certificate of title in order for the mortgage to
be valid against third parties.!'
The operative effect of each of these statutory provisions is to
deprive the mortgagor (true owner) of all indicia of title. This
is accomplished by either registering the lienholder as legal
17. Pottstown Finance Co. v. TBach, 58 Montg. 223 (Pa. 1929).
18. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 128 (1st ed. 1936).
19. Conditional sales are generally included within the purview of regis-
tration provisions. Many of the statutes specifically mention conditional
sales as transactions which must be registered on the title certificate: ARIz.
CODE ANN. c. 66, § 231 (1931); MONT. REV. CODES c. 53, § 110 (1947); NEB.
REV. STAT. C. 60, § 110 (1943). One state, however, Pennsylvania, specifi-
cally exempts conditional sales from the provisions of the registration act,
and merely requires that ordinary recordation be made of conditional
sales. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 940.5 (Supp. 1950).
20. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 195-197 (1949); HAWAI REv. LAWS § 12758
(1945); NEB. REV. STAT. C. 60, § 110 (1943); WASH. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 6312-7 (1937).
21. See note 20 supra.
22. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 195-197 (1949); HAwAu REV. LAWS § 12758
(1945).
23. NEB. REV. STAT. c.60, § 110 (1943); WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6312-7
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owner, or by requiring him to retain the title certificate, as
aforesaid. The owner is left solely with possession. Any attempt
by him to sell, transfer, or further encumber the title to his
automobile will inevitably meet with failure, since he technically
has no legal title to grant. Even the most cursory of investi-
gations by the intended assignee would arouse his suspicions, for
it would reveal that title to the vehicle lies in someone other than
the purported owner in possession. Furthermore, in that great
majority of jurisdictions which require an assignment of the
certificate of title in order to validate a transfer of a motor
vehicle, no prospective purchaser would consider dealing with
an automobile owner who had no such certificate. Therefore,
by removing all indicia of legal title from the owner-mortgagor,
he is effectively prevented from selling or further mortgaging
his automobile. Hence, both the lienholder and all subsequent
innocent parties are adequately protected.
A further noticeable variation is the effect these unique
statutes have on the chattel mortgage recordation acts. Two
states, California and Washington, in which the mortgagee must
register as legal owner, adhere to the general rule that such
registration statutes supersede the recordation acts with respect
to motor vehicle security transactions. 24 On the other hand,
both Nebraska and Hawaii provide the mortgagee with an
alternative: he may either file his mortgage in compliance with
the ordinary recording statute, or he may follow the procedure
prescribed by the motor vehicle registration act to register him-
self as legal owner of the automobile and/or retain the certificate
of title. Compliance with either of the two statutory provisions
will operate as constructive notice to third parties.25 Thus, in
the four jurisdictions requiring the mortgagee to register as
legal owner, there is an even division of authority as to superse-
dure of recordation acts.
All of the statutory provisions heretofore discussed have been
of a mandatory nature. Compliance with the registration require-
ments was shown to be necessary in order for the encumbrance
to be legally binding on all who dealt with the vehicle. However,
a vastly different result obtains when the controversy as to the
24 CAL. V.H. Con E §§ 195-197 (1949); WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6312-7(1937).
25. HAWAU REV. LAWS §12758 (1945); NEB. REv, STAT. c. 60, § 110(1943).
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validity of the lien or mortgage is solely between the parties to
the security transaction. Regardless of the strict provisions
of the applicable registration statute, the cases hold with un-
animity that a security transaction is valid as between the
immediate parties, notwithstanding a failure to properly regis-
ter, record, or note the encumbrance on the certificate of title.26
The propriety of such a rule is unquestionable. The motor
vehicle registration acts, as well as chattel mortgage recording
statutes, were intended solely for the protection of subsequent
innocent third parties who might have occasion to deal with the
vehicle. An examination of the language of each statute will
disclose that a failure to comply therewith does not invalidate
the security transaction, but merely negates all constructive
notice and thus renders the encumbrance void as against inno-
cent third parties. 27 Therefore, there is neither judicial prec-
edent nor legislative basis for allowing repudiation of a security
transaction because of failure to comply with registration pro-
visions.
Nevertheless, innumerable attempts have been made by motor
vehicle owners to resist a mortgagor's lien because it had not
been properly noted on the title certificate. In Clynch v. Bowers, 28
for example, a foreclosure suit on a chattel mortgage was de-
fended on the ground that failure to note the lien on the certifi-
cate of title invalidated the entire transaction. The Texas court,
however, properly repudiated this defense and allowed fore-
closure, remarking that the mortgage was still binding between
the parties to the transaction regardless of non-compliance with
any registration act. Justification for any other result is in-
conceivable, particularly when the specific language of the
statutes is considered.
An even more brazen attempt to avoid a mortgage was made
by the defendant in a Missouri criminal prosecution. 2 Charged
with concealing and removing mortgaged property (an automo-
bile), defendant vehemently argued that, since the mortgage was
not accompanied by proper assignment and registration of the
title certificate, it was legally invalid; hence the automobile was
26. Janney v. Bell, 111 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1940); Milburn v. Athans,
190, S.W.2d 388 (Tex Civ. App. 1945); Clynch v. Bowers, 164 S.W.2d 768
(Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
27. See note 6 supra.
28. 164 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
29. State v. Griffin, 228 S.W. 800 (Mo. 1921).
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technically not "mortgaged" property. The court refused to
consider such a defense, and in affirming defendant's conviction,
declared the mortgage valid between the parties despite any
failure to conform to registration statutes. °
It is thus apparent that the motor vehicle registration statute,
rigid though its provisions may be, operates solely to protect
third parties. A mortgagor cannot avoid his obligations nor
defeat his creditor's lien by citing a non-compliance with the
motor vehicle registration act, a statute not intended for his
protection.
STATUTES PROVIDING FOR LIEN NOTATION ON TITLE
CERTIFICATE, BUT WITH No PROVISION AS TO NOTICE
Probably the most controversial issue in this field is the inter-
pretation and effect of the second group of registration statutes
which direct that all liens be noted on the certificate of title,
but which make no provision as to constructive notice when the
statute is either followed or ignored. The registration acts
referred to are those providing that "all liens and encumbrances
should be noted on the certificate of title," with no mention of
constructive notice nor of the validity of encumbrances not thus
noted.31 Because of the equivocalness of the statutory language,
the operative effects of this type of statute rest mainly on
judicial construction and interpretation.
The sharpest conflict of authority, as one would expect, con-
cerns the effect of this type of statute on the ordinary recorda-
tion acts: does the registration act supersede the recording
requirements, or must an automobile security transaction still
be filed and recorded the same as any common chattel mort-
gage? If the former interpretation is given to the registration
provisions, the statute then becomes essentially the same as the
strict statutes previously discussed.3 2 However, if the latter
30. Ibid.
31. Fifteen states employ this type of statute: ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 78,
§ 106 (1947); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 9 5 1h, § 78 (1949); IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 47
§ 2502 (Burns, Supp. 1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. C.8, § 135 (1949);
MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 66% § 25 (Cum. Supp. 1947); MIcH. VEH.
CoDE §§ 217, 222, 238 (1949); Nsv. COMp. LAWS § 4419 (1929); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. c. 20, § 52 (1943); N.D. REv. CODE c. 39, § 0509 (1943); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 23.6 (1950); ORE. COMr. LAWS ANN. tit. 115, § 117
(1940); S.D. COD § 44.0203 (1939); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 1517 (1949);
WIS. STAT. § 85.013 (1949); WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. C. 60, § 208 (Supp.
1949).
32. See note 6 supra.
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interpretation is applied, the statute assumes an entirely differ-
ent meaning, since it must co-exist with equally applicable provi-
sions of the recordation act.
First to be considered are those jurisdictions in which this
type of registration provision is given a strict interpretation,
and held to supersede the recordation act. The most recent deci-
sion illustrating this judicial construction is General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Davis,3 wherein a conditional vendor duly
recorded the instrument but failed to note the encumbrance on
the certificate of title. Possession of the vehicle and of the
certificate was transferred to the conditional buyer, who then
sold the automobile to an innocent third party. The Kansas
Supreme Court held that the latter acquired a free and clear
title, despite the duly recorded conditional sale. The unique
reasoning advanced by the court was that the conditional vendor
had invested the debtor with full indicia of ownership, posses-
sion plus a clear title certificate and hence was estopped subse-
quently to assert any claim of title.34 It is significant to note
that here, as in similar decisions elsewhere, the court does not
expressly declare the recordation act superseded by the motor
vehicle registration provisions, yet actually arrives at that result
by failing to allow a claim based on a duly recorded conditional
sale.
Similarly, the Indiana Supreme Court denied the claim of a
conditional vendor when the automobile was subsequently sold
to a bona fide purchaser. In this case, the plaintiff had actually
noted the lien on the certificate of title, but the conditional
purchaser fradulently altered it and obtained a new certificate35
which was clear. The court, in holding that the conditional
vendor should have supervised the filing of the application for a
new certificate of title, declared:
.. one holding a lien upon a motor vehicle must insofar as
he can reasonably do so, protect himself and others there-
after dealing in good faith, by complying and requiring
compliance with the provisions of applicable laws concern-
ing certificates of title to motor vehicles.3r
33. 169 Kan. 220, 218 P.2d 181 (1950)..
34. Ibid.
35. In Indiana, a purchaser of a second-hand auto must apply for a new
certificate of title, and enclose the old certificate received from his assignor.
36. Central Finance Co. v. Garber, 95 N.E.2d 635, 636 (Ind. App. 1950).
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Again, as in the Kansas decision 3 7 the language of the court
intimates that the registration provisions are paramount to
ordinary recordation requirements, yet an express holding to
that effect is lacking. No other jurisdictions have as yet adopted
the Kansas and Indiana viewpoints, but since the registration
statutes are relatively new and the body of interpretive case law
comparatively small, it is expected that others will follow in the
future.
On the other hand, a considerable number of jurisdictions in
this group have specific statutory provisions or judicial decisions
declaring that the chattel mortgage recordation act is not
superseded by any registration requirements.-8 For example,
the registration acts of Maryland and North Dakota, although
requiring that all liens be entered on the certificate of title,
explicitly provide that the lien or mortgage must also be evi-
denced by a duly recorded instrument. 39 The same doctrine
has been judicially expressed in King-Godfrey, Inc. v. Rogersl'
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which asserted:
We are of the opinion that the statute was passed exclu-
sively for the benefit of the state, and that, as a registration
act, has no application to creditors and vendees of the person
who holds the certificate of registration. . . . We find no
language in the act cited by plaintiff indicating that it was
the intention of the legislature that this enactment was to
supersede the Mortgage Registration Act.41
In thus holding, the court denied relief to a mortgagor whose
lien was duly noted on the certificate of title, but not filed and
recorded with the county clerk. Here, then, is an unequivocal
declaration that recordation acts remain applicable to automobile
security transactions, in spite of the lien provision of the motor
vehicle registration statute.
At least one state, Michigan, occupies a compromising position
with regard to this conflict of authority. Its code provides that
either recordation of the encumbrance or a notation thereof on
the certificate of title will be sufficient to create constructive
37. See note 33 sup'r.
38. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 66A, § 2& (Cur. Supp. 1947); Mum.
VUH. CODE §§ 217, 222, 238 (1949); N.D. Rsv. CODE c. 39, § 0509 (1943);
King-Godfrey, Inc. v. Rogers, 157 Okla. 216, 11 P.2d 935 (1942).
39. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 66%, § 25 (Cum. Supp. 1947); N.D.
CODE c. 39, § 0509 (1943).
40. 157 Okla. 216, 11 P.2d 935 (1932).
41. Id. at 217, 11 P.2d at 936.
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notice.42 The failure of the certificate to disclose an existing
lien on the vehicle will not protect a purchaser from a duly
recorded chattel mortgage. Therefore, the mortgagee apparently
has the alternative of either recording the instrument or enter-
ing the lien on the certificate of title.
This sharp conflict of authority as to the effect of these regis-
tration provisions on recordation acts is, to some extent, explain-
able. In Kansas and Indiana, those states in effect holding the
recordation act to be superseded, the motor vehicle registration
act requires that the lien always be noted on the certificate of title
itself.,' Thus the provision was obviously intended as a protection
to creditors and vendees of the owner of the mortgaged vehicle.
On the other hand, in several of the states declaring the recorda-
tion act not superseded, the vehicle registration statute provides
only that the lien be noted on the application for certificate of
title, which is then duly filed at some county office.4 There
is no requirement that any notation be entered on the certificate
of title itself. It is thus quite logical to assume that such a
statute was never intended to protect parties dealing with the
automobile owner, but rather, as the Oklahoma Supreme Court
pointed out,45 was a provision enacted solely for the benefit of
the state by establishing competent records of automobile titles.
Hence, where the registration statute does not require the lien
to be noted on the certificate of title itself, there is no sound
basis for the recordation and filing requirements to be disre-
garded.4
With regard to controversies solely between the parties to a
security transaction, the general rule observed by the jurisdic-
tions in this group is identical with that followed in states with
stricter statutes. Failure to note the lien or encumbrance on
the certificate of title does not nullify or invalidate the security
transaction; such violation of the registration act only serves
42. MicH. VEH. CODE §§ 217, 222, 238 (1949).
43. IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2502 (Burns, Supp. 1949); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. c. 8, § 135 (1949).
44. N.D.REv. CODE c. 39, § 0509; Oxi.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 23.6 (1950).
45. See note 40 supra.
46. The Oregon registration provisions are quite unusual: Oun. COMp.
LAws. ANN. tit. 157, § 117 (1940). While containing the usual require-
ments for notation of the lien on the certificate of title, the statute further
makes it a criminal offense for the mortgagee to fail in this respect and
imposes a fifty dollar fine for such failure.
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to negate constructive notice to third parties.47 Hence a mort-
gagee cannot be denied foreclosure merely because he failed to
exact a compliance with the statute, and the certificate of title
in the mortgagor's possession consequently shows no registered
encumbrance. 8
The main problem raised by this second group of statutes,
which remain silent as to notice, is their effect on the recordation
acts. Once it has been determined whether or not the recording
act has been superseded (with regard to motor vehicles), the
other operative effects of the registration requirements should
prove of no material difficulty to the practitioner.
REGISTRATION STATUTES WITH No PROVISIONS
AS TO LIENS AND ENCUMBRANCES
The remainder of the jurisdictions in the United States are
those with no express statutory provision for the registration
of liens and encumbrances on motor vehicles.50 Virtually all of
these states, however, enforce some form of regulation requiring
the registration of motor vehicle titles, and consequently issue
certificates of title to vehicle owners. No statutory provision,
either express or implied, specifies that there be any notation on
these certificates, nor is there any other requirement for a
unique mode of registration of encumbrances on motor vehicles.
The logical presumption, therefore, is that security transactions
involving automobiles must be recorded just as any ordinary
chattel mortgage, in conformity with the applicable recording
act.51
47. Leopold v. Universal Credit Co., 290 Ill. App. 305, 8 N.E.2d 727(1937).
48. Ibid.
49. If it is determined that the recordation act is superseded and does
not apply to automobile transactions, the registration statute will then
assume all the qualities of the strict group of statutes previously discussed;
but if the recordation act remains applicable, it must be assumed that all
the common law rules of chattel mortgages, conditional sales and the like
remain in force with regard to motor vehicle security transactions.
50. Fifteen states have no Hen provisions: Alabama, Connecticut,
Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and
New York.
51. There is one particular deviation from this rule. New Jersey has an
express statutory provision that chattel mortgages on automobiles must be,
recorded as any other mortgages, but conditional sales and other devices
retaining title in the vendor must be registered with the Commission of
Motor vehicles, N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, c. 10, § 14 (Supp. 1950).
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The absence of statutory requirements for the notation of
liens on the certificates of title, occurring in sixteen states,
raises an interesting and highly controversial problem of con-
flict of laws. Assume, for example, that a chattel mortgage on
an automobile is duly executed and legally recorded in State X,
wherein there is no provision for the encumbrance to be entered
on the certificate. The vehicle is then transported and sold in
State Y, which maintains a strict registration statute requiring
that all liens be noted on the certificate of title for constructive
notice to be given to third parties. The purchaser in State Y
obviously relies upon the clear certificate of title in buying what
he believes is an unencumbered title. The problem, over which
there is an unresolvable controversy today, is whether the mort-
gagee, having fully complied with the law in the state wherein
the mortgage was executed, can now claim his lien in the other
state, whose registration laws render the mortgage improperly
asserted.
The general conflict of laws rule, with respect to ordinary
chattel mortgages, is that proper recordation in the state where
the chattel was located when the mortgage was executed is valid
and sufficient notice to the entire world, removal of the chattel
to another state notwithstanding :52
... when personal property incumbered by a mortgage valid
as against a subsequent innocent purchaser in the state in
which the property was located when the mortgage was
given is surreptitiously removed to this state [Arizona], the
mortgagee may follow the property, and his rights are
superior to those of a similar purchaser within this
state .... 53
An example of the application of this principle to an automobile
encumbrance is the recent Texas case of Bank of Atlanf v.
Fretz,14 in which an automobile mortgaged in another state not
issuing certificates of title was brought into Texas and sold
to a bona fide purchaser. The court held the foreign mortgage
was still valid, even though it was not evidenced by a notation
on a certificate of title, as required by the Texas registration
statute. This illustrates a clear adherence to the general con-
flict of laws rule as aforesaid, which refers to the law of the
52. Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34 Ariz. 408, 274 Pac. 155 (1928).
53. Id. at 414, 274 Pac. at 157.
54. 148 Tex. 551, 226 S.W.2d 843 (1950).
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original situs of the chattel in determining the validly and effect
of a mortgage lien.
However, several states with the strict type of lien-notation
statutory provision 5 have taken an opposite viewpoint.50 In a
recent Florida case" the court was confronted with the claim
of a Georgia mortgagee. The mortgage had been duly executed
on an automobile in Georgia, where there is no statutory provi-
sion for noting encumbrances on the certificate of title. The
vehicle was subsequently sold in Florida to an innocent pur-
chaser, who received an assignment of the certificate of title
with no indication of an infirmity appearing thereon. Since
the code of Florida strictly required that all encumbrances be
noted on such certificate, the court refused to allow the mort-
gagee's claim, even though he had completely complied with
the law of the state in which the mortgage was executed. This
obvious departure from the general principles of conflict of laws
was apparently intended to preserve the integrity and conclu-
siveness of the certificate of title as an indication of outstanding
encumbrances.
The conflict of authority is distinct, based solely on whether
or not a given state will apply its own registration provision
for lien notations to security transactions consummated in other
jurisdictions. There appears to be no sound justification for a
departure from the general rule consistently applied to security
transactions involving other chattels; a mortgage duly executed
and properly recorded in one state should be given full effect in
any other jurisdiction, regardless of any strict lien-notation
provision the latter may have included in its registration statute.
Purchasers in the second state will not be deceived or misled,
since either the license, registration receipt, or certificate of
title will instantly disclose to them that the automobile originated
in another state. With such knowledge, they might reasonably
inquire into the lien registration statutes of that state, and thus
ascertain whether or not the certificate of title may be relied
upon as a conclusive indication of encumbrances. There is there-
fore no adequate basis for any state to impose its own statutory
55. See note 6 supra.
56. Lee v. Bank of Georgia, 159 Fla. 481, 32 So.2d 7 (1947); Rice St.
Motors v. Smith, 167 Pa. Super. 159, 74 A.2d 535 (1950) ; N.M. STAT. ANN.
c. 68, § 115 (1941).
57. Lee v. Bank of Georgia, 159 Fla. 481, 32 So.2d 7 (1947).
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requirements and the consequent effects thereof on a security
transaction properly executed elsewhere.
Nevertheless, courts will still dogmatically demand strict com-
pliance of a foreign lien with their own local registration re-
quirements. This should serve as an ominous warning to practi-
tioners and prospective lienors in those states with no vehicle
registration provision as to encumbrances. Compliance with the
local law, which probably requires a mere recordation of the
security instrument, will not suffice to fully protect the mort-
gagee. To insure against a possible loss of the lien in another
state, a cautious mortgagee should register his claim in accord-
ance with the strictest possible requirements of any other
jurisdiction. Hence, a security transaction consummated in a
state with no registration provision as to liens should neverthe-
less be evidenced by a notation on the certificate of title. In this
manner, the claim of the lienor will be recognized as against
third parties in any state to which the automobile may be
transported and sold.
Therefore, compliance with the local law is not the chief
problem arising in this third group of jurisdictions, which have
no statutory provision for the registration of liens. Rather
the problem is to adequately register and note the encumbrance
so that the claim cannot be defeated by subsequent purchasers
in another state with stricter registration requirements.
SPECIAL PROVISIONS AS TO DEALERS
Many jurisdictions have adopted, through legislative or
judicial process, special provisions for automobile dealers with
regard to security transactions. One of the main objectives of
these special regulations has been to maintain the ordinary
channels of automobile commerce free and unobstructed. Ac-
cordingly, the statutory requirements for dealers are intended
to protect, at all costs, the purchaser who obtains a vehicle in
the ordinary course of business.
For example, probably the simplest and most effective statute
which creates the necessary protection to the purchaser from
a dealer is employed in New York. This enactment specifically
provides that any mortgage on vehicles in a dealer's possession
is never good against a purchaser in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, even though such mortgage be fully recorded.58 Conse-
58. N.Y. LIEN LAW § 230 (c) (Supp. 1942).
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quently, the purchase of an automobile from a New York dealer
is greatly facilitated, there being no necessity for the vendee to
investigate the title or search the records for any outstanding
encumbrances. The result, of course, is a highly desirable free
flow of automobile commerce within the state. The statute might
seem unreasonably harsh on mortgagees, who would lose their
liens if the dealer should sell the mortgaged vehicles in the
ordinary course of business. However, such lienors, given ade-
quate warning by this unequivocal statute, have ample opportu-
nity to protect their claim by merely refusing to allow the dealer-
mortgagor to retain possession of the encumbered vehicles. In-
deed, the New York law, in few words, completely eliminates the
title and constructive notice problems of dealer's mortgages,
without the creation of rank injustice to the lienholders.f'
A substantially different problem with regard to dealers arises
in those states requiring that a lien notation be made on the
certificate of title. Generally such certificates are issued to the
first purchaser of a new vehicle, and are obtained by forward-
ing the bill of sale and the application for a title certificate to the
appropriate state office. 60 However, while the new vehicle is
still in the possession of the dealer (who obtained it from the
manufacturer), a certificate of title therefor has usually not yet
been issued. How, then, can there possibly be a notation of an
encumbrance without a title certificate?
Several states, recognizing this problem, have specifically
exempted dealer's stock from the lien-notation provision of the
registration act.61 Furthermore, in Missouri the statute,62 which
requires that all encumbrances be entered on the certificate of
title, subsequently provides that such procedure does not apply
in the case of a purchase-money mortgage on a new car. In
interpreting this statute, a Missouri appellate court cited the
purpose of this exemption: certificates of title are not issued
59. It would seem absolutely necessary that New York have some pro-
vision, inasmuch as that state has no law requiring lien notations on the
certificate of title. The only proper way to assert a mortgage would be
ordinary recordation. Therefore, without the above statute, a New York
purchaser would be compelled to search the voluminous chattel mortgage
records to ascertain the clarity of his vendor's title.
60. See, for example, Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 301.190 (1949).
61. FLA. STAT. § 319.15 (1941); Interstate Securities Co. v. Barton, 236
Mo. App. 325, 153 S.W.2d 393 (1941).
62. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 443.480 (1949).
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until at least ten days after the sale of a new car, hence the
dealer, as mortgagor, has nothing upon which to note the lien
created by the purchase-money mortgage. The court further
asserted that in such transactions involving new cars ordinary
recordation of the mortgage would suffice to give constructive
notice.6-
On the other hand, Ohio has adopted a directly opposite view-
point, and specifically declares that encumbrances on a dealer's
new cars must be noted on the certificate of title in compliance
with the registration act.64
The divergence of opinion is readily explained. Unlike Mis-
souri, Ohio requires that the title to every new automobile in a
dealer's possession be evidenced by a "manufacturer's certificate
of title," a document procured by the dealer from the manu-
facturer. Upon sale of the vehicle, the purchaser is assigned this
manufacturer's certificate which he then exchanges for a new
certificate of title naming himself as owner. 5 Thus even while
a new automobile remains unsold in an Ohio dealer's posses-
sion, its ownership is evidenced by a certificate upon which
liens and encumbrances incurred by the dealer (or the first
purchaser) may be noted. There is therefore no logical reason
for exempting a dealer's new vehicles from the provisions of the
registration act.
Two signficant problems are thus raised when the security
transaction involves an automobile dealer. The first is created
by the desire to maintain a free and unobstructd flow of motor
vehicle commerce. In this respect, courts will frequently be
prone to protect an ordinary purchaser from outstanding title
encumbrances. Hence a prospective mortgagee, before consum-
mating his transaction with a dealer, should be particularly
cautious in ascertaining whether or not, under the law of the
state, his lien will be valid against a subsequent purchaser in
the ordinary course of business. The second problem concerns
the notation of liens, as required by the registration act; where
the absence of a certificate of title (the vehicle being new and
63. Interstate Securities Co. v. Barton, 236 Mo. App. 325, 153 S.W.2d 393
(1941).
64. Crawford Finance Co. v. Derby, 63 Ohio App. 50, 25 N.E.2d 306
(1939).
65. OHIO CODE ANN. §§ 6290-9 (1940).
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unsold) prevents the proper notation of the lien, the mortgagee
may usually protect his claim by duly recording the same.
CONCLUSION
The motor vehicle registration statutes have had a crushing
impact on the law of chattel mortgages and recordation. No
security transaction involving an automobile can safely be
consummated today without reference to the applicable registra-
tion provisions of the state to ascertain the manner in which
constructive notice may be given. Even in the absence of a
special statute, the prudent mortgagee will look to the stricter
laws of other jurisdictions and comply therewith, thereby elimi-
nating the possibility of an outstate sale defeating his rights.
In any event, a party to a security transaction involving a
motor vehicle should be cognizant of the fact that his rights may
not be determined solely by the ordinary recordation and chattel
mortgage laws. Reference to bot& the recordation act and the
motor vehicle registration statute, plus a determination as to
which is paramount, is the only procedure which will insure full
protection of the party's rights.
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